Guy Kahane and Julian Savulescu\(^1\) reply to my paper ‘Valuing Disability, Causing Disability’\(^2\) with two major objections:

(i) ‘it’s not question-begging to regard [the] implications [of the mere-difference view of disability] as unacceptable’ (p. 1)

(ii) ‘the grounds that Barnes offers for potentially blocking some of these implications fail to explain our conviction that it’s wrong to cause disability’ (p. 1)

I will respond to each of these objections in turn. But first I will address some of the substantial misrepresentations of my paper which occur in Kahane and Savulescu’s reply.

1. SOME CLARIFICATION

Before I can respond in detail to Kahane and Savulescu’s arguments, I need to do some ground-clearing. Kahane and Savulescu attribute many things to me - and many of these are not things that are actually said in my paper.\(^3\) So it’s important to clarify which parts of their response are addressing my actual views, and which parts are addressing views they - erroneously - attribute to me.

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3 They also, in some cases, fail to attribute to me things which very clearly are said in my paper. For example they write: ‘Barnes understands the Unacceptable Implications Objection as taking the form of a conditional: [I]f disability is mere-difference, then it is permissible to cause disability (and likewise impermissible to remove or prevent disability). Presumably, however, for this to be any kind of objection, we also need to add that...it's in fact impermissible to cause disability (and permissible, or even required, to remove or prevent disability).

I do not, however, need to add any such thing, given that my presentation of the argument (p. 93) is this: ‘If disability were mere difference rather than bad-difference, it would be permissible to cause disability; it is obviously impermissible to cause disability; therefore, disability is not mere-difference; it is bad-difference.’
Kahane and Savulescu claim I endorse the following conditional, which they label ‘INJUSTICE’:

If it is within the means of a society to remove the overall disadvantage of disability, then, so long as that isn’t done, that disadvantage must be due to prejudice and injustice (and therefore the Mere Difference View is correct) (p. 3).

I absolutely do not endorse this conditional. I am not even sure what it means. (Is the ‘therefore’ clause in brackets meant to be embedded in the consequent of the conditional? Or is their claim that I take the truth of the conditional to establish the truth of the mere-difference view?)

I do not know why they take my paper to involve an endorsement of this conditional, given that I never use the terms ‘disadvantage’ or ‘injustice’ in my paper and explicitly do not make any arguments which would have the conclusion ‘therefore the mere-difference view is true’. My paper is explicitly about a specific pair of objections to the mere-difference view, not reasons for thinking the mere-difference view is true. Moreover, whether one endorses this conditional seems entirely orthogonal to whether one accepts a mere-difference view. One could think that disability is a horrible misfortune (that is, one could accept a very strong version of a bad-difference view), and think that it’s precisely because disability is so terrible that societies are obligated - as a matter of justice - to remove its disadvantages when they can.

So let me clarify. I am not sure what ‘overall disadvantage’ is supposed to mean, and I am skeptical that there are context and parameter-free facts about whether people are at ‘overall disadvantage’ compared to others. I understand what it is to be at a disadvantage with respect to a particular activity, or at a disadvantage in a particular social context, but I doubt that ‘overall disadvantage’ is a useful concept. I am happy to accept, though, that
there are plenty of disadvantages associated with disability that are not socially-mediated, which are not matters of injustice, and which would persist even in the absence of prejudice and stigma against the disabled. All of this is perfectly consistent with a mere-difference view of disability. As a person with mobility limitations, for example, I would be at a disadvantage with respect to various physical activities - running, lifting, etc - regardless of my social circumstances. That I would be at this specific kind of disadvantage is not a matter of injustice. The mere-difference view doesn’t need to deny any of this. What is denied is that we can infer a systematic connection between this type of disadvantage and overall wellbeing.

Nor is the mere-difference view committed to anything particularly radical in saying this. Contra what Kahane and Savulescu’s discussion seems to assume (p. 3), we don’t in general think that there’s a neat correlation between opportunity and wellbeing, or between ability and wellbeing: the latter doesn’t supervene on and isn’t reducible to the former. We don’t assume that Ebeneezer Scrooge has a higher level of wellbeing than Bob Cratchit, simply because Scrooge’s wealth and social position clearly give him more opportunity than Cratchit. We don’t assume that Michael Phelps has a higher level of wellbeing than we do, simply because Michael Phelps has more physical ability than we do.

Kahane and Savulescu also attribute to me the following:

[The defender of a mere-difference view] must, for example, hold that it would be wrong to cause a deaf fetus or child to become hearing, nor even to remove very severe intellectual and bodily disabilities. And they must also hold that doing that would be just as wrong as causing disability (p 5).

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4 See p. 90.

Again, I do not say any such thing. I make no claims about comparative wrongness in my paper. The discussion they cite is entirely a discussion about *permissibility*, not about comparative wrongness or degree of wrongness. To be clear, I am explicit that my own particular stance on removing disability is not something the defender of a mere-difference must hold. And to be clear, I don’t endorse the claims of comparative wrongness which Kahane and Savulescu erroneously attribute to me. I think it’s much worse to change a person in a way that will make them subject to prejudice, stigma, and discrimination than it is to change a person in a way that will make them a part of the comfortable majority. (So, for example, while I think it’s both wrong to attempt to change an inter-sex child into a female child (p. 103), I think it would be worse to turn a female child into an inter-sex child. And I think that’s consistent with a mere-difference view of being inter-sex.) No part of commitment to a mere-difference view - or of my own particular stance on the symmetry between causing and removing - involves saying that causing disability and causing non-disability are equally wrong.

It’s also important to note, in a discussion like this, that we’re discussing abstract, sanitized cases. But the mere-difference view of disability can of course allow that in messier, real-world cases there are all sorts of practical variables which might matter to whether one is justified in causing or removing disability. Income and financial situation, employment stability, access to health care and health insurance - these are all things which matter in real-world reasoning about disability. The mere-difference view can of course allow that such circumstances affect which choices are permissible, the comparative moral status of particular choices, and so on.

After mischaracterizing my views about permissibility as views about comparative wrongness, Kahane and Savulescu remark that:

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6 ‘I think it is important to note that adopting a mere-difference view of disability does not entail a specific stance on the cause/remove discrepancy’ (p. 100).
This result [about comparative wrongness], Barnes asserts, isn’t a problem for the Mere Difference View. For such acts aren’t problematic from the point of view of the Mere Difference View. If they seem impermissible because people think that disability makes one worse off, then this just begs the question (p. 5).

Again, I do not say this. Careful readers will note that the phrases ‘begs the question’, ‘question begging’, and their cognates do not appear anywhere in the paper. I’ll address what I actually say - and try to reconstruct Kahane and Savulescu’s complaint as an argument against what I do say - in the next section.

Kahane and Savulescu then further state that:

Barnes responds in the same way to other cases where her suggested grounds for impermissibility have no hold. For example, if someone unknowingly puts herself at great risk of becoming disabled, and a bystander who could prevent this does nothing, no issue of unconsented interference arises. Similarly, if a natural process is about to preventably turn an abled fetus disabled, non-interference, if it implies anything, implies that we should do nothing (p. 5).

I will admit that this section of their response is particularly mystifying, since readers of my paper can note that I do not discuss these cases at all. I thus have no idea why it is that Kahane and Savulescu read me as responding to such cases. Since they have attributed these views to me, however, let me clarify for the record. Becoming disabled can be a serious harm - as I say quite explicitly (p. 90) - even if being disabled is not. So of course the mere-difference view can allow that insofar as bystanders are obligated to prevent serious harms when they easily can, a bystander is obligated to prevent someone from becoming disabled if she easily can.
Regarding a ‘natural process which is about to preventably turn [a non-disabled] fetus disabled’, it doesn’t seem to me as though the mere-difference view itself requires a specific line on such a case. I am not sure what Kahane and Savulescu intend to encompass by their talk of ‘natural processes’, but it seems perfectly compatible with accepting a mere-difference view that you take a different attitude toward a case in which a genetic abnormality will cause a fetus to develop a disability and a case in which a virus will, if left unchecked, cause a fetus to become disabled, though these might both be construed as ‘natural processes’. More generally, these issues will hinge on complicated questions - questions independent of the mere-difference view - about whether there is a morally significant distinction between causing and preventing, whether there is a morally significant distinction between doing and allowing, and so on. The wider point, as emphasized in the paper, is that there isn’t any obvious commitment between accepting a mere-difference view and taking a specific line on such cases. These issues are complex, multi-faceted, and involve all sorts of issues to which acceptance of a mere-difference view is simply orthogonal.

Kahane and Savulescu continue:

Some further problematic implications of the Mere Difference View that Barnes considers and endorses include:

- That it permits prospective parents to behave - perhaps even for frivolous reasons - in ways that would cause the conceived child to be severely disabled;
- That it suggests that the significant resources and effort expended on finding ways of preventing or removing disability are unjustified (p. 6).

If you think it’s wrong - as the mere-difference view allows - to cause a fetus to become disabled, you might for similar reasons think it’s wrong to fail to prevent something else from causing a fetus to become disabled.
Once again, I do not say anything so simplistic. What I say is that there are circumstances in which it’s acceptable for parents to knowingly choose to conceive a disabled child instead of a non-disabled child. What I also say - explicitly and in detail (p. 108-109) - is that the mere-difference view can allow that there are many, many ways in which parents might knowingly conceive a disabled child rather than a non-disabled child which are wrong, precisely because they arise from frivolous, careless, or thoughtless actions. What I further say (p. 110-111) is that there is nothing wrong with devoting resources and effort to finding ways of preventing and removing disability. Some disabled people want to be non-disabled - and plausibly some disabled people would still want to be non-disabled even in a more just world - and for those people such efforts are important. But it’s also important to appreciate the social context in which we focus on ‘cures’, and the effect that this has on the lives of disabled people. What I say, to be clear, is this:

Given the way the world actually is, such research isn’t the obvious and unequivocal good that many take it to be. Nor should it be looked to as the ultimate dream and wish of disabled people and their families, or the ultimate solution to the problems faced by disabled people (p. 112-113).

That is a far cry from what Kahane and Savulescu attribute to me.

2. CAUSATION-BASED OBJECTIONS AND QUESTION BEGGING

Kahane and Savulescu spend a great deal of time explaining how - contra my argument - causation-based objections to the mere-difference view of disability are not question-begging. Again, this line of argument is perplexing, given that I never discuss or even mention question-begging.

Here is what I do say in my original paper. There is a striking disconnect between the way disability is typically understood within the disability rights movement and the way
disability is typically understood within analytic philosophy. The former see disability as something that makes you different, but not something which inherently, intrinsically, or automatically makes you worse off. Call this the mere-difference view of disability.

Most analytic philosophers who write on disability, in contrast, reject this view of disability. They think that there is a deep connection between disability and significant reduction in overall wellbeing - a connection which goes beyond the contingent social barriers and stigmas disabled people are subjected to. Call this the bad-difference view of disability.

The first section of my paper is devoted to spelling out, in greater detail, what exactly this mere-difference/bad-difference distinction amounts to, as it turns out to be quite a complicated matter. I’ll not rehearse those points of detail here. The remainder of my paper is devoted to considering a particular family of objections to the mere-difference view: objections based on what it makes (im)permissible to cause. Some have claimed that, if it were true, the mere-difference view would make it permissible to cause disability. Others have claimed that, if it were true, the mere-difference view would make it impermissible to cause disabled people to become non-disabled (that is, to remove or ‘cure’ disability). The fact that this pair of objections exist in tandem - and are sometimes defended by the very same people - should by itself indicate that there’s a great deal of confusion about what exactly the mere-difference view would license if true, but let’s leave that to the side for now.

Here is what I say about these arguments:

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8 Interested readers can see p. 89-93.

9 See, for example, Chapter 7 of Buchanan, Allen; Dan W. Brock; Norman Daniels; Daniel Winkler (2000): From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
It is worth emphasizing [their] philosophical importance. The bad-difference view is often assumed rather than argued for: we are meant to have the intuition that it is correct, or simply take it as obvious. But the bad-difference view is a characterization of disability which is not obvious to many disabled people. And relying on brute intuition can offer little in the way of dialogue for those who simply don’t share the intuition and who might be skeptical that the intuitions of the majority offer particularly good insight into the well-being of the minority. The causation-based objections are an attempt to do better—to get some independent traction on the mere-difference/bad-difference debate. They try to show that the mere-difference view has implausible, impermissible consequences, even by the lights of its defenders (p 94).

Let me elaborate. Some version of a mere-difference view - and it is again worth emphasizing that there are many different, disparate versions - is standardly accepted within the Disability Rights and Disability Pride movements. It’s also the conception of disability that dominates academic discussions of disability in sociology and the rest of the humanities, and which is increasingly common within psychology (especially rehabilitation psychology). Nor is the prevalence of this view limited to academia. It is
increasingly represented in education\(^{10}\), in political discourse\(^{11}\), and in popular television and film.\(^{12}\)

So to be clear, the mere-difference view is how the disability community often describes their own experiences of disability. And, increasingly, people are listening. The mere-difference view - and the wide spectrum of specific views about disability which it encompasses - are far from fringe characterizations held only by a radical few (once we allow our quantifiers to range beyond analytic philosophers, that is).

It is in this particular socio-political context that the discussion of the mere-difference view within analytic philosophy can seem puzzling - and in which the causation objections look particularly important. Often, the mere-difference view is simply dismissed as ‘counter-intuitive’ or obviously false. Not only do such dismissals fail to

\(^{10}\) See, for example, the work of education groups like Just Different and The Autism Acceptance Project.

http://www.justdifferent.org
http://www.taaproject.com/

\(^{11}\) Here, for example, is what Dylan Orr, chief of staff for the Office of Disability Employment Policy, says about disability (and its connection to the struggle for LGBT rights) on the White House’s blog: ‘I hope to one day live in a world that truly celebrates the wide variation of the human form, condition and experience. To get there, we all have a part to play. Change does not arise from pity, shame, exclusion or low expectations. It arises from empowerment, celebration of difference, and a willingness to take risks as individuals and communities – to take pride in who we are.’


And here is what Claudia Gordon, who recently stepped down as White House Public Engagement Advisor to the Disability Community (a position created by President Obama) has to say about her own disability: ‘[Deaf education] gave me a new perspective on my own identity as a deaf person because it allowed me to see that being deaf wasn’t a barrier towards having a brighter future, that it was actually another way of experiencing life: a visual approach to life which entailed visual language, visual learning. We had culture. I began to embrace my new identity.’

From the documentary ‘Deaf People: Tell Me More’ An English transcript is available at: http://www.allreadable.com/b59a8THb The original ASL interview can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VaGSspTZ90

\(^{12}\) The view is discussed positively in television shows like Daredevil and Friday Night Lights, and is arguably one of the major themes of the animated film Wreck-it Ralph.
provide anything in the way of interesting philosophical dialogue, they also fail to engage seriously with what a minority group is saying about itself - a move which has very unhappy history. (More on this later.)

But the causation-based objections attempt to do something more. They attempt to show that the mere-difference view has obviously unacceptable consequences. It appears to be a background assumption of these arguments that these are implications which reasonable people - including disability advocates - should not and cannot accept. Perhaps disability advocates haven’t thought through the implications of their view - in which case they are confused. Or perhaps disability advocates are willing to say obviously immoral, unprincipled things - in which case we are justified in rejecting their view. Either way, there’s a major problem.

And my claim is that the causation-based objections don’t succeed in establishing this. They don’t show any internal tensions of the mere-difference view or demonstrate that defenders of the mere-difference view are committed to things they don’t want to be committed to. And they can only show that the mere-difference view licenses (clearly or obviously) unacceptable consequences by explicit appeal to the claim that disability is bad\(^\text{13}\) - that is, by appeal to the central claim that the mere-difference view denies.

Kahane and Savulescu characterize this portion of my argument as a charge of question-begging. And they are right that it would be incorrect to call these arguments question-begging - which is why I never do. They are also correct to point out that we don’t generally take it to be a requirement of a good objection that it appeals to only principles which are common ground, or which the opposing view can accept. They write:

\(^{13}\) If you object to the term ‘bad’ here, replace it with ‘something sub-optimal’, ‘something detrimental’, something which makes you worse off’, etc.
Barnes thinks, however, that for [the causation-based objection] to have any independent traction, it cannot appeal to the claim that disability is importantly different from features of people that are mere differences, such as sex or hair color, since that would beg the question. This constraint, however, misrepresents what is required for an objection to have independent traction. Consider some common philosophical objections:

- If morality is merely a myth, then it’s not wrong to torture infants for fun.
- If moral relativism is true, then female genital mutilation is morally required for the members of some cultures.
- If utilitarianism is true, then we may be required to torture an innocent person if this will lead to greater aggregate utility.

These are not particularly sophisticated objections, but they are widely perceived to be rather powerful. Yet all of them blatantly fail Barnes’ methodological constraint (p. 8-9).

Of course it is absurd to suggest that I think the defender of a bad-difference view cannot appeal to any significant differences between disability and other mere-difference features (sexuality, sex, etc). Disabilities often require medical care and assistive technology, whereas sexual orientation does not. Disability is often acquired in adulthood, whereas sexuality is not. And so on. What I object to - without any reference to question-begging - is unsupported appeal to the claim that disability is something bad or sub-optimal as a way to motivate the causation-based objections.

Kahane and Savulescu are right, of course, that we in general do not require that a successful objection be one which appeals only to principles which the opposing view can accept. They are wrong, however, to suppose that I suggest this as some sort of general methodological principle. It is nowhere in my paper defended as any kind of general principle or ‘methodological constraint’. Rather, I argue (p. 104-105) that the case of disability is special - the mere-difference view is not just one among many
philosophical theories, and how we should address it might be importantly different than how we address specific ethical theories like utilitarianism or moral relativism. And that’s because the mere-difference view encompasses a broad range of things which a marginalized group is - with increasing force, frequency, and social impact - saying about themselves, their own experiences, and their own wellbeing.

Kahane and Savulescu construe my case for this to be based on a claim about bias (p. 9, note 26). Because non-disabled people are biased against the disabled, they shouldn’t trust their intuitions about the badness of disability. My claim, however, is not anything so simple. Rather, the central claim is an argument based on induction (p. 104).\textsuperscript{14} There is a long and very unhappy history of ignoring what marginalized groups say about themselves and their own wellbeing. Consider, to give two recent examples, how we treated the claims of gay people in the 1950s, or how we treated the claims of transgendered people in the 1980s. Ignoring the claims of a marginalized group about their own wellbeing is something that’s not only been a common source of error, it’s also something that’s been a common source of severe social injustice.\textsuperscript{15}

It is in this specific socio-political context - and given this political background - that I think it’s a very serious thing indeed to dismiss the claims about wellbeing common within the disability rights movement.\textsuperscript{16} That’s not at all to say those claims are

\textsuperscript{14} See also my (2009)


\textsuperscript{16} In addition to these socio-political considerations, such dismissals look unwarranted given that non-disabled people don’t seem to be very good at thinking about disability. Empirical evidence, for example suggests that non-disabled people are strikingly bad at predicting the life satisfaction and perceived wellbeing of disabled people. For an introductory summary see Loewenstein, G and Schkade, D (1999) ‘Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings’, in Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds, \textit{Wellbeing: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology}, pg. 85-105.

There is also substantial reason - both empirical and philosophical - to think that the non-disabled have a very poor grasp of what it’s like to be disabled. (Although they often, bizarrely, think they have good insight into what it’s like.) See especially the discussion on p. 56-70 in Paul, LA (2014): \textit{Transformative Experience}. Oxford: OUP.
sacrosanct or infallible. It’s just to say that I think you need better reason to dismiss the mere-difference view of disability than you do to dismiss a random metaethical theory.

My further claim is then two-fold. Firstly, the causation-based objections don’t give us reason for rejecting the mere-difference view that goes beyond ‘But it’s obvious that disability is bad!’ And secondly, ‘But it’s obvious that disability is bad!’ is not sufficient reason to dismiss the mere-difference view.¹⁷

3. THE RIGHT REASONS

Kahane and Savulescu further argue that, even if the mere-difference view can block some of unacceptable implications which were attributed to it by the causation objections, it cannot block them in the right way.

One worry they bring up is that the ways in which I suggest that the mere-difference can block unacceptable permissions ‘are all symmetric, not differentiating causing disability and causing ability, yet our convictions are strongly asymmetric’ (p. 11). That is, Kahane and Savulescu suggest that the reasons I supply against causing disability (in some cases) all apply equally well to causing non-disability. But this simply isn’t true. We can reasonably expect transition costs to be much more severe for people who become disabled than for people who become non-disabled¹⁸, simply because it’s hard to adapt to disability in a world that’s designed for the non-disabled. Likewise, as I discuss repeatedly, disabled people face social barriers, stigma, and ostracism that are simply not faced by the non-disabled.

¹⁷ For detailed discussion of this point see especially chapter 2 of Barnes, Elizabeth (forthcoming): The Minority Body. Oxford: OUP.

¹⁸ Though it’s important to point out that people who become non-disabled do often face significant transition costs. See, for example, the discussion of sight restoration operations in the congenitally blind in Sacks, Oliver (1993): ‘To See and Not to See’. The New Yorker. May 10, 1993.
Kahane and Savulescu continue:

Nor can these grounds explain differences in the severity of the wrongness of causing different kinds of disability to explain these, Barnes can appeal only to transition costs or perhaps differences in how prejudiced people are against different disabilities. Most of us would find causing someone to be severely intellectually disabled to be far worse than causing them to be deaf or paralyzing one of their legs. Yet, on the face of it, becoming severely intellectually disabled involves little or no transition costs (p. 11).

To reiterate: I do not discuss comparative wrongness anywhere in my paper. But there are obviously better things to be said than what Kahane and Savulescu attribute to me here. For example, on many popular views of personal identity causing a human organism to become severally cognitively disabled would be to end the existence of one person and bring another person into existence. Personal identity notwithstanding, to cause a person to become severely cognitively disabled would be to rob them of many of the things about themselves which they value and hold most dear, to interrupt their projects, to drastically alter their personality and mental life, etc. Obviously the mere-difference view can say that this is seriously wrong. And though the mere-difference view does not, by itself, spit out any specific commitments about how we determine comparative wrongness, these are obviously the kinds of things that a defender of a mere-difference view can point to say that it is worse to cause something to be severely cognitively disabled than to cause someone to become deaf.

Kahane and Savulescu’s more general concern, however, is that while the mere-difference view can block various unacceptable forms of causing disability, it can’t do so in a systematic way. The intuition behind such cases, Kahane and Savulescu claim, is not

19 Any view on which personal identity is a matter of psychological continuity, for example, would have this result. And primitivist views would leave it open.
merely that they are impermissible, but that they are impermissible for a single reason: the negative affect that disability has on wellbeing. The mere-difference view cannot capture this, and so can’t adequately respond to the causation-based objections.

But it’s important to note that if you accept a mere-difference view you would *expect* that there is no systematic reason why cases of causing disability are impermissible. As I tried to highlight in my original discussion, there are many different ways one can cause disability. And these different cases bring up all sorts of different variables like consent, social stigma, autonomy, the parent/child relationship, etc. If, as almost all defenders of the mere-difference view do, you think that disability is a complex social phenomenon (rather than a purely biological feature of bodies), it would be ludicrous to suppose that there would be a single, unified story to tell about all such cases.

Kahane and Savulescu insist, though, that:

> If we have the conviction that causing disability is impermissible, and what best explains this conviction is that disability tends to make a person worse-off, then so long as this conviction survives reflection we have reason to reject the Mere Difference View. That there may be other grounds for finding some acts of causing disability impermissible doesn’t change that (p. 11).

I of course agree with them that they have a reason to reject the mere-difference view. Where we disagree is whether they have a particularly *good* reason. I am sure they are secure in their conviction that disability makes people worse off, and nothing I’m going to say here will dissuade them from that conviction. The question, however, is whether mere conviction that disability is correlated to reduction of wellbeing in this way is actually an epistemologically sturdy foundation to rest on, in the face of a groundswell of disabled people telling you otherwise.
Kahane and Savulescu conclude with the following observation:

It would be wrong, we believe, for a pregnant woman to take thalidomide to alleviate morning sickness while knowing that this would cause her child’s limbs to become serious deformed or for her to take a drug that would make her child deaf and blind. . . We believe that many people share these convictions, including some who may otherwise find the Mere Difference View attractive. Contrary to Barnes, we have argued that these convictions give powerful grounds for rejecting this view (p. 12).

Yes, many people do share such convictions. I am one of them. I spend a long section of my paper (section IV, p. 97-99) explaining why it is no problem whatsoever for the mere-difference view to say that such cases are wrong. So what they are saying here is not ‘contrary to Barnes’ at all. It is, in fact, exactly what Barnes says in the paper they are replying to.

As I hope I have shown, the errors in Kahane and Savulescu’s response are fairly severe. They are also illustrative. All too often, disability-positive positions are dismissed by philosophers as extreme or radical. But all too often, as in this case, this is done without being clear on what is actually being said by those who defend a disability-positive position.